18 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: 303 Committee Meeting - 18 June 1964

1. Item I: Autonomous Operations

This was raised in view of Manuel Ray's request for $25,000 and indications that he is attempting to make a new expedition to Cuba in a chartered ship. Various courses of possible action with Ray were discussed, ranging from cutting him off altogether to giving him the money. It developed that Ray is acting inconsistently with the agreement with him which was that he would operate outside the United States. Therefore it was decided that we would tell him that he must abide by the agreement, that he must find a base of operations outside the United States and if he does we will endeavor to secure the release of his ship which is now in Puerto Rico, and that we will give him financial support.

2. With respect to Artime, it was pointed out that Artime's operations are very costly. CIA has put $4.6 million into this operation this year - the future bill will be large, but not as great. FitzGerald reported that Artime planned one hit and run operation a month, but he noted he would be lucky if he could pull off one every 3 months. Bundy seemed to feel Artime was more of a threat than an operator and should be maintained for that purpose and operations discouraged. FitzGerald pointed out this is not practical. It was agreed to proceed with Artime recognizing that U.S. or CIA support of him would probably be "blown". Furthermore it was suggested that he be cautioned to be careful and not follow unduly reckless courses of action.

3. There was a long discussion on the implications of the CIA June 10th memorandum reporting plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate leading Cuban government leaders. This report was taken most seriously by the group. It was felt that the purpose of advising us through CIA of these plans was to put us on notice and therefore we should not fail to take appropriate precautionary actions to see that no assassination attempt of which we had knowledge was carried out. It was decided that appropriate authorities, i.e. Department of Justice and the FBI, should be notified and urged to take appropriate action against the individuals involved.

I took the position that we are overly exercised, that I was inclined to write the whole thing off as Miami cocktail party talk rather than definite plans. Had I seen the Memo before it was distributed, I would have investigated the sources and the credibility of the whole thing before taking action. However the group were more concerned than I and therefore planning to discuss the subject with the Attorney General and possibly Mr. Hoover.

I pointed out that copies of the Memorandum had been sent to the Attorney General and the Department of Justice but there had been no conversation on the subject.

ACTION: Discuss with General Carter and Mr. Helms steps we should take to establish the credibility of the report; also communicate with the FBI through Mr. Papich. Also I should call the Attorney General personally.

4. Prior to the meeting Mr. Vance asked my opinion of using the 22 million psyops leaflets which inadvertently had been printed on U.S. manufactured white sulphite paper, all as reported in MACV cable MAC SOG 5050 dated 18 June 1964 (IN 09143). I told Vance that I felt we should go ahead. It was too bad it had been done this way, but it is one of those things that a person not thoroughly acquainted with this type of operation might overlook. He was in agreement and presumably will instruct the release of the leaflets.

JAM/mfb

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6 TOP SECRET

NON-CIA TELETYPED MESSAGE 09143 1 of 3

ACTION: FE 1-8

TEIF034

OO RUEPIA

A

DE RUMSMA 1647F 18/0641Z

O 180627Z

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUEPCR/WHITEHOUSE

RUEPDA/SECSTATE

RUEPDA/OSD

RUEPIA/CIA

RUEKDA/JCS

INFO RUHPA/CINCPAC

ZEN/AMEMB SAIGON

RUHPA/CAS HONO

BT

9-DCI
10-DDCI
11-DDP
12-ADDP
13-SOD
14-FILE
15-VR
16-RF

TS 941

18 JUN 64 IN 09143

T O P S E C R E T MAC SOG 5050

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION SPECIAL HANDLING SPECAT

EXCLUSIVE STATE FOR SULLIVAN, OSD FOR MCNAMARA AND ANTHIS WHITEHOUSE FOR MCGEORGE BUNDY, CIA FOR MCCONE, CARTER AND HELMS, JCS FOR GEN TAYLOR, INFO AMEMB SAIGON FOR AMB LODGE AND NES, CINCPAC FOR ADM FELT.

A. OPLAN 34A

1. IN ORDER TO MEET OPERATIONAL SCHEDULES FOR JUNE AND JULY PSYOPS LEAFLET DROPS, TWENTY TWO MILLION LEAFLETS

#9

TOP SECRET

WERE PRINTED ON SIXTEEN POUND US GRADE WHITE SULPHITE PAPER. THIS WAS NECESSITATED DUE TO UNAVAILABILITY OF OTHER PAPER SUITABLE FOR IHIGHSPEED LEAFLET PRESS.

2. UNLESS THESE PRINTED LEAFLETS ARE AUTHORIZED FOR DISSEMINATION OVER NORTH VIETNAM UNDER SCHEDULED OPLAN 34A OPERATIONS NUMEROUS PSYOPS OPPORTUNITIES EXPLOITABLE UNDER PRESENT LIGHT OF THE MOON PERIOD WILL BE MISSED AND TIMELINESS OF SEVERAL OF THESE LEAFLETS WILL BE LOST.

3. REALIZE SUBJECT OF PLAUSIBLE DENIAL BECOMES INVOLVED HERE BUT FEEL IN THIS CASE PROBLEM OF POSSIBLE ATTRIBUTION TO UNITED STATES MUST BE JUDGED IN LIGHT OF FOLLOWING CIRCUMSTANCES:

A. PAPER STOCK USED IS STANDARD US MANUFACTURE OBTAINED THROUGH US ARMY QUARTERMASTER SOURCES AND IS ASSUMED TO BE AVAILABLE ON WORLD MARKET FOR SALE TO ANY CONSUMER. MAP SUPPORTED FORCES SUCH AS ARVN OR OTHERS COULD HAVE ACCESS TO SAME TYPE PAPER.

B. ANY DESIRE TO ATTRIBUTE OPLAN 34A ACTIONS TO US COULD BE MORE READILY SUBSTANTIATED BY DRV PRODUCING AGENT PERSONNEL OR MORE CRITICAL ITEMS LOST IN SOME PREVIOUS TEAM OPERATIONS.

C. PAPER STOCK ITSELF IS NOT ONLY ATTRIBUTABLE ITEM, BUT ALSO OFFSET PRINTING PROCESS EMPLOYED WITH OTHER TYPE PRINTED MATTER.

D. IN ESSENCE ALL OPLAN 34A ACTIONS ARE DESIGNED TO IMPRESS DRV THAT PRESSURE IS BEING APPLIED BY MAJOR POWER. USE OF US PAPER AND INDIRECT INDICATION OF US INVOLVEMENT

TEND CONTRIBUTE TO THAT BASIC OBJECTIVE.

E. ONLY CHEMICAL ANALYSIS COULD ASCERTAIN THAT PAPER USED IS U.S. MANUFACTURED STOCK.

F. IN ANY EVENT, U.S. BLAMED BY DRV FOR ALL OPLAN 34A ACTIONS THEY CHOOSE TO PUBLICISE AND U.S. IN EACH CASE COULD CHOOSE TO DENY OR IGNORE ACCUSATIONS.

4. REQUEST APPROVAL TO PROCEED WITH DISSEMINATION OF PREPARED LEAFLETS AT THIS TIME AND UNTIL SUITABLE FOREIGN SOURCE PAPER STOCK CAN BE OBTAINED WHICH SHOULD BE WITHIN TWO WEEKS.

5. IN ORDER TO MEET CURRENT JUNE SCHEDULE REQUEST REPLY WITHIN 48 HOURS.

GP-1

BT

13-00000

3 April

9/14

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Special Group Meeting (5412) - 2 April 1964

1. Briefly reviewed the status of North Viet Nam operations 34A. All concluded that the results have been negative and disappointing. I took the position this was to be expected but that now the period of organization had past, we might get some better results.

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[The CIA IDEALIST-TACKLE program was approved except for the North Korean flight. Defense interposed an objection to this flight on the grounds that they were nearing agreement for the release of helicopter crews which have been held in North Korean custody.

> ACTION: This particular flight should be withheld. USIB and most particularly DIA should be informed in the meeting On Wednesday, the 8th.]

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2. [Discussed the problem of captains and crews for the SWIFT and NASTY craft and the necessity of withdrawing the German mercenaries and the Swedish captains. This was recognized as a must. It was agreed that substitution of Chinese Nationalist captains was acceptable on an interim basis.

> ACTION: DDP to arrange with Secretary Vance for appropriate actions by the Department of Defense through their representatives in Taiwan for the recruitment, movement, compensation and care of these captains.]

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3. [Reviewed DoD peripheral reconnaissance which was approved after extended discussion of capabilities of the new radar in Cambodia. It was agreed that the field would be instructed to carefully observe operation of this radar to determine whether the U-2s were being picked up by it. If this turned out to be a regular practice by the Cambodians, the matter should be resubmitted for reconsideration.

> ACTION: The field should follow this carefully with MACV.]

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4. [Review of ground rules for U-2 in North Viet Nam as outlined. Secretary Vance's paper was approved.]

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5. [The recommendation to overfly Laos was held in suspension. DoD was asked to bring in specific details of the particular 34A operations which required such overflights and the probable advantages of continuing the operations by means of overflying Laos. State held very positive view against Laotian overflights.]

6. The proposed infiltration and exfiltration operations in Cuba were approved. Mr. FitzGerald was warned not to cache arms with agents felt to be under Castro control. He stated that this particular Cache involved money and other things, but no arms. The caching of small quantities of arms elsewhere in Cuba was approved. Memorandum on the operation of autonomous exile groups was noted and no instructions were given to restrain these operations. The overall question of future sabotage operations was discussed. Mr. Bundy agreed to bring the matter before the President and senior Cabinet officers promptly.

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7. [The Chilean political action as outlined in the CIA paper of April 1st was approved. It was pointed out that since the paper was drafted, COS and Ambassador in Santiago had reached an agreement about the handling of funds.]

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8. [Proposed political action in Zanzibar was approved. Mr. Waller gave a brief account of the results of the favorable negotiations with the British. Understood thtat implementation of this paper was to be coordinated with the British in accordance with agreement reached in London.]

OTHER MATTERS:

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1 [Statement was made that a CIA U-2 was "painted" with radar on February 24th, implication being that the CIA U-2 was in the vicinity of Phnom Penh.

ACTION: I would like to know the facts on this.]

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2. [Question was raised about need for continuing the 30 mile intrusion into Cambodia and Laos. Indications were that the photography had produced no useful information for MACV.

ACTION: This question should be studied and brought up for discussion at meeting on April 9th. I should cable Carter to investigate fully.]

JAM/mfb

5/mc

27 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of 5412 Group

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1. The question of the extent of the SAC planes operations in South Vietnam was discussed against the background of Dr. McMillan's letter of February 26th.

1. Overflights of South Vietnam -- O.K.

2. Overfly that part of North Vietnam which is within 30 miles of South Vietnam or of the coast line.

3. That part of Laos which is within 30 miles of the South Vietnamese border.

4. That part of Cambodia which is not more than 30 miles from South Vietnam.

With respect to 4., instructions were to be given that the primary purpose of the flights was to survey border activity and the 30 mile shot is provided to give range and operational flexibility. I felt in reviewing McMillan's proposal that if the SAC planes were to go as far north as the 21st parallel, then they should go all the way to the China border and the proposed CIA operation out of Takhli should be abandoned. This raised the question of whether civilian or military planes and pilots should be over North Vietnam to the extent which could not be explained as being "off course". All agreed that the SAC Air Force operations should be either limited as outlined above or should cover the entire country. It was decided to refer the matter to higher authority for decision. I interposed no objection to SAC's overflight of North Vietnam but merely took the position that if they went as far north as proposed by McMillan, they should cover the entire country.

2. The program of infiltration and exfiltration of Cuba was approved with the exception of one operation -- operation #434 -- about which Mr. Cheever explained that he thought the agents we were resupplying were under Cuban control and the resupply operation was for the purpose of deception. It was agreed that the resupply should be confined to money and

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medicine and that the small amount of arms involved should not be cached. Otherwise the operation was approved.

Alexis Johnson and Mr. Bundy raised questions of the consequences of finding an arms cache or knocking over an infiltration at the time of the OAS debate on the Venezuelan problem. Arguments were persuasive that we should go slowly during this period. I read from the February 25th Cuban checklist of the deterioration of the spirit of the people of Cuba, the feeling that we were about to recognize the Castro government and the apathy toward further resistance as evidence of the price we are paying for slow-downs and deferments of action against Cuba. I said that I thought our Cuban program was in complete disarray. We had no policy or covert operations. We now are hesitating on infiltration and exfiltration, our economic denial program was failing, while Castro is making significant progress.

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3. [The forcast of NRO activities for March was approved.]

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4. [The status report on political action in Kenya was approved.]

JAM/mfb

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TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

File

February 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY

Attached is a paper which I would like to table for discussion at the next meeting of the 5412 group.

Cyrus Vance
Cyrus R. Vance

Attachment

Mr Jessup,
Will you circulate to members &
ask U.A. Johnson's people to bring [illegible]
or [illegible] Alexis talk chiefly with him/
McGB

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

February 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Clandestine and Covert Activities Against Cuba

The objective of the U. S. Government is to overthrow the Castro/Communist regime in Cuba. In accomplishing its objective, the U. S. is not willing to risk nuclear war or, at this time, substantial deterioration in its relations with its Allies, or significant escalation in tensions between this country and the Soviets. Thus, any covert U. S. program should be set at a level that is not likely to incur such risks. Such a program would appear to be a low-risk, clandestine program of harassment and sabotage directed against Cuba. In addition, a program of higher risks seems justified when it is directed against Cuban subversion of Latin America.

Actions Against Cuba

1. Sabotage. A low level campaign of sabotage and harassment against Cuba might include such targets as the Canete Saw Mill, smaller POL storage plants (such as the one at Pilon), the Nazabal warehouse and pier, and ships (such as barges or Cuban patrol boats). Where possible, it would seem desirable to make the raids appear to have come from within Cuba. Cuban ships outside Cuba can be sabotaged by discreet means (such as placing sand in gears or sugar in fuel).

2. Harassment of Free World Shipping to Cuba.

a) Initiate a more comprehensive program of overt and covert pressure against Free World firms trading with Cuba. In this connection, develop a comprehensive list of firms doing business with Cuba, check them against known DOD off-shore and foreign purchase suppliers so that appropriate retaliation can be applied against those suppliers.


b) Place unactivated incendiary and explosive devices in cargoes and on ships bound for Cuba and subsequently "tip off" port or shipping officials so that they will search and discover the devices with the attendant publicity.

COPY No. 1 of 6 COPIES

3. Covert Economic Activities.

a) Intensify covert activities directed against critical commodities destined for Cuba with resort, if necessary, to carefully considered and controlled preclusive buying.

b) Make it known discreetly through the press that we maintain careful records of the companies dealing with Cuba, suggesting without saying so that these records constitute a potential "blacklist."



c) Form a group of responsible and qualified Cuban exile businessmen to maintain pressure on firms trading with Cuba by indicating that such firms will have no future in a post-Castro Cuba.

4. To the extent possible, encourage dissidence among different factions in Cuba - Peking, Moscow, Nationalist -- by spreading rumors, internal and external sabotage designed to accomplish this purpose (such as actions against homes of leaders, etc).

Actions Against Cuban Subversion in Latin America

1. Develop a list of vulnerable Cuban agents in Latin America against whom a concentrated program of bribery, blackmail and coercion can be instituted.

2. Carefully select key Latin American members of the Havana-Peking school and institute a program of kidnapping, and personal and physical harassment, while attempting to attribute these acts to rivals who support Moscow. Institute the reverse process as a retaliatory program against Moscow supporters.

Any of the foregoing activities would be conducted against a background of U. S. propaganda (black, white and gray) and political activity designed to increase internal dissension within Cuba, to support economic isolation of Cuba, to avoid splitting with our allies over the Cuban issue and to reduce, and perhaps eliminate, Castro subversion of Latin America. In addition, surveillance activities should be significantly stepped up.